The calloc()
function takes two arguments: the number of elements to allocate and the storage size of those elements. Typically, calloc()
implementations multiply these arguments to determine how much memory to allocate. Historically, some implementations failed to check if whether out-of-bounds results silently wrap wrapped [RUS-CERT Advisory 2002-08:02]. If the result of multiplying the number of elements to allocate and the storage size wraps, less memory is allocated than was requested. As a result, it is necessary to ensure that these arguments, when multiplied, do not wrap.
Modern implementations of the C standard library should check for wrap. If the calloc()
function implemented by the libraries used for a particular implementation properly handle handles unsigned integer wrapping on the multiplication (in conformance with INT30-C. Ensure that unsigned integer operations do not wrap) when multiplying the number of elements to allocate and the storage size, that is sufficient to comply with this recommendation and no further action is required.
Noncompliant Code Example
...
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
size_t num_elements; long *buffer = (long *)calloc(num_elements, sizeof(long)); if (buffer == NULL) { /* Handle error condition */ } /* ... */ free(buffer); buffer = NULL; |
...
In this compliant solution, the two arguments num_elements
and sizeof(long)
are checked before the call to calloc()
to determine if wrapping will occur.:
Code Block | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
| ||||
long *buffer; size_t num_elements; if (num_elements > SIZE_MAX/sizeof(long)) { /* Handle error condition */ } buffer = (long *)calloc(num_elements, sizeof(long)); if (buffer == NULL) { /* Handle error condition */ } |
Note that the maximum amount of allocatable memory is typically limited to a value less than SIZE_MAX
(the maximum value of size_t
). Always check the return value from a call to any memory allocation function in compliance with MEM32ERR33-C. Detect and handle memory allocation standard library errors.
Risk Assessment
Unsigned integer wrapping in memory allocation functions can lead to buffer overflows that can be exploited by an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the permissions of the vulnerable process. Most implementations of calloc()
now check to make sure silent wrapping does not occur, but it is not always safe to assume the version of calloc()
being used is secure, particularly when using dynamically linked libraries.
Recommendation | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
MEM07-C |
High |
Unlikely |
Medium | P6 | L2 |
Automated Detection
Tool | Version | Checker | Description | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Astrée |
| Supported, but no explicit checker | |||||||
CodeSonar |
| ALLOC.SIZE.MULOFLOW | Multiplication overflow of allocation size | ||||||
Compass/ROSE |
Parasoft C/C++test |
| CERT_C-MEM07-a | The validity of values passed to library functions shall be checked |
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
Related Guidelines
SEI CERT C++ |
Coding Standard | VOID MEM07-CPP. Ensure that the arguments to calloc(), when multiplied, can be represented as a size_t |
MITRE CWE | CWE-190, Integer overflow (wrap or wraparound) CWE-128, Wrap-around error |
Bibliography
[RUS-CERT] | Advisory 2002-08:02, "Flaw in calloc and Similar Routines" |
[Seacord |
2013] | Chapter 4, "Dynamic Memory Management" |
[Secunia] | Advisory SA10635, "HP-UX calloc Buffer Size Miscalculation Vulnerability" |
...
...