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Returning references to internal mutable members of a class can compromise an application's security, both by breaking encapsulation and also by providing the opportunity to corrupt the internal state of the class (whether accidentally or maliciously). Performing a defensive copy before returning a reference to a mutable internal state ensures that the caller can only modify the copy and not the original internal state. Wiki MarkupPugh \[[Pugh 2009|AA. Bibliography#Pugh 09]\] cites a vulnerability discovered by the Findbugs static analysis tool in the early betas of JDK 1.7 where the {{sun.security.x509.InvalidityDateExtension}} class returned a {{Date}} instance through a {{public}} accessor without creating defensive copies.As a result, programs must not return references to private mutable classes.

See rule OBJ13-J. Ensure that references to mutable objects are not exposed for details about leaking references to non-private objects.

Noncompliant Code Example

This noncompliant code example shows a getDate() accessor method that returns the sole instance of the private Date object.:

class MutableClass {
  private Date d;

  public MutableClass() {
    d = new Date();
  }

  public Date getDate() {
    return d;
  }
}

An untrusted caller can manipulate a private Date object because returning the reference exposes the internal mutable component beyond the trust boundaries of MutableClass.

Compliant Solution (clone())

Returning a reference to a defensive copy of a mutable internal state ensures that the caller cannot modify the original internal state, although the copy remains mutable. This compliant solution returns a clone of the Date object from the getDate() accessor method. This is safe because while Although Date can be extended by an attacker, this approach is safe because the Date object returned by getDate() is controlled by MutableClass and is known not to be a malicious nonmalicious subclass.

protectedpublic Date getDate() {
  return (Date)d.clone();
}

Note that defensive copies performed during execution of a constructor must avoid use of the clone() method when the class could be subclassed by untrusted code. This restriction prevents execution of a maliciously crafted overriding of the clone() method . For more details, see rule "OBJ00(see OBJ07-J. Limit extensibility of classes and methods with invariants to trusted subclasses only."Sensitive classes must not let themselves be copied for more details).

Classes that have public setter methods, that is, methods whose purpose is to change class fields, must follow the related advice found in rule " FIO00OBJ06-J. Defensively copy mutable inputs and mutable internal components. " Note that setter methods can (and usually should) perform input validation and sanitization before setting internal fields.

Noncompliant Code Example (Mutable Member Array)

In this noncompliant code example, the getDate() accessor method returns an array of Date objects. The method fails to make a defensive copy of the array before returning it. Because the array contains references to Date objects that are mutable, a shallow copy of the array would be is insufficient because an attacker can modify the Date objects in the array.

class MutableClass {
  private Date[] date;

  public MutableClass() {
    date = new Date[20];
    for (int i = 0; i < 20date.length; i++) {
      date[i] = new Date();
    }
  }

  public Date[] getDate() {
    return date; // orOr return date.clone()
  }
}

Compliant Solution (Deep Copy)

This compliant solution creates a deep copy of the date array and returns the copy, thereby protecting both the date array and the individual Date objects.:

class MutableClass {
  private Date[] date;

  public MutableClass() {
    date = new Date[20];
    for(int i = 0; i < 20date.length; i++) {
      date[i] = new Date();
    }
  }

  public Date[] getDate() {
    Date[] dates = new Date[20date.length];
    for (int i = 0; i < 20date.length; i++) {
      dates[i] = (Date) date[i].clone();
    }
    return dates;
  }
}

Noncompliant Code Example (Mutable Member Containing Immutable Objects)

In this noncompliant code example, class ReturnRef contains a private Hashtable instance field. The hash table stores immutable but sensitive data (for example, social security numbers [SSNs]). A getter method The getValues() method gives the caller access to the hash table by returning a reference to it. An untrusted caller can use the getter this method to gain access to the hash table; as a result, hash table entries can be maliciously added, removed, or replaced. Furthermore, multiple threads can perform these modifications can be performed by multiple threads, providing ample opportunities for race conditions.

class ReturnRef {
  // Internal state, may contain sensitive data
  private Hashtable<Integer,String> ht = new Hashtable<Integer,String>();

  private ReturnRef() {
    ht.put(1, "123-45-6666");
  }

  public Hashtable<Integer,String> getValues(){
    return ht;
  }

  public static void main(String[] args) {
    ReturnRef rr = new ReturnRef();
    Hashtable<Integer, String> ht1 = rr.getValues(); // Prints sensitive data 123-45-6666
    ht1.remove(1);                                   // Untrusted caller can remove entries
    Hashtable<Integer, String> ht2 = rr.getValues(); // Now prints null,; original entry is removed
  }
}

In returning a reference to the ht hash table, this example also hinders efficient garbage collection. See rule "OBJ11-J. Write garbage-collection-friendly code" for more information.

Compliant Solution (Shallow Copy)

Make defensive copies of private internal mutable object state. For mutable fields that contain immutable data, a shallow copy is sufficient. Fields that refer to mutable data generally require a deep copy.

This compliant solution creates and returns a shallow copy of the hash table containing immutable SSNs. Consequently, the original hash table remains private, and any attempts to modify it are ineffective.

class ReturnRef {
  // ...
  private Hashtable<Integer,String> getValues(){
    return (Hashtable<Integer, String>) ht.clone(); // shallowShallow copy
  }

  public static void main(String[] args) {
    ReturnRef rr = new ReturnRef();
    // Prints nonsensitive data
    Hashtable<Integer,String> ht1 = rr.getValues(); 
    // prints non-sensitive data Untrusted caller can only modify copy
    ht1.remove(1);                             
     // untrustedPrints caller can only modify copynonsensitive data
    Hashtable<Integer,String> ht2 = rr.getValues(); // prints non-sensitive data
  }
}

When a hash table contains references to mutable data such as a series of Date objects, each of those objects must also be copied by using a copy constructor or method . For further details, (refer to rules "FIO00OBJ06-J. Defensively copy mutable inputs and mutable internal components" and "OBJ08OBJ04-J. Provide mutable classes with copy functionality to safely allow passing instances to untrusted code safely for further details)."

Note that making deep copies of the keys of a hash table do not need to be deep copiedis unnecessary; shallow copying of the references suffices because a hash table's contract dictates that its keys must produce consistent results to the equals() and hashCode() functions methods. Mutable objects whose equals() or hashCode() method results may be modified are not suitable keys.

This example is also more amenable to efficient garbage collection, as described in rule "OBJ11-J. Write garbage-collection-friendly code."

Exceptions

*OBJ05-EX0:* According to Sun's Secure Coding Guidelines \[[SCG 2007|AA. Bibliography#SCG 07]\]:

If a class merely serves as a container for mutable inputs or outputs (the class does not directly operate on them), it may not be necessary to create defensive copies. For example, arrays and the standard collection classes do not create copies of caller-provided values. If a copy is desired so updates to a value do not affect the corresponding value in the collection, the caller must create the copy before inserting it into the collection, or after receiving it from the collection.

Exceptions

OBJ05-J-EX0: When a method is called with only an immutable view of an object, that OBJ05-EX1: When callers expose only unmodifiable views of an object to a method, the method may freely use the unmodifiable immutable view without defensive copying. This decision should be made early in the design of the API. Note that new callers of such methods must also expose only unmodifiable views. (See rule "SEC14-J. Provide sensitive mutable classes with unmodifiable wrappers.")immutable views.

Risk Assessment

Returning references to internal object state (mutable or immutable) can render an application susceptible to information leaks and corruption of its objects' states, which , consequently , violates class invariants. Control flow can also be affected in some cases.

Automated Detection

Sound automated detection is infeasible; heuristic checks could be useful.

Related Vulnerabilities

Pugh [Pugh 2009] cites a vulnerability discovered by the Findbugs static analysis tool in the early betas of JDK 1.7 in which the sun.security.x509.InvalidityDateExtension class returned a Date instance through a public accessor without creating defensive copies.

Related Guidelines

Bibliography

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Image Added Image Added OBJ04-J. Provide mutable classes with copy functionality to allow passing instances to untrusted code safely      04. Object Orientation (OBJ)