OBJ11-J. Defensively copy private mutable class members before returning their references

Returning references to internal mutable members of a class can seriously compromise the security of an application because of the resulting sub par encapsulation properties and susceptibility to corruption of the class's state. A caller can modify the private data if instead of defensive copies of mutable class members, direct references to them are returned.

Returning references that refer to private data to untrusted code can be more pernicious than returning the references to trusted code. If a class provides copy functionality that trusted code can use to pass defensive copies of the instance to untrusted code (OBJ10-J. Provide mutable classes with copy functionality to allow passing instances to untrusted code safely), the implementing class may violate this guideline. However, the burden is now transferred to the trusted code as it is expected to reliably use the copy functionality before operating on the instance or passing it to untrusted code.

Note that the performance costs of violating this guideline (or using copy functionality such as clone()) might be significantly more than using an accessor method that returns a copy of a single mutable member. This is because a well designed copy method returns a copy of the complete object, including all mutable components) as opposed to that of a single member, which makes it relatively slower.

Pugh [[Pugh 2009]] cites a vulnerability discovered by the Findbugs static analysis tool in the early betas of jdk 1.7. The class sun.security.x509.InvalidityDateExtension returned a Date instance through a public accessor, without creating defensive copies.

Noncompliant Code Example (mutable member containing immutable objects)

This noncompliant code example defines a class that contains a private Hashtable instance field. The hash table stores immutable data of sensitive nature (SSN numbers). A getter method getValues() gives the caller access to the hash table by returning a reference to it. When invoked by untrusted code, entries may be maliciously added, removed or replaced.

class ReturnRef {
  // Internal state, may contain sensitive data
  private Hashtable<Integer,String> ht = new Hashtable<Integer,String>(); 
 
  private ReturnRef() {
    ht.put(1, "123-45-6666");
  }
 
  public Hashtable<Integer,String> getValues(){ 
    return ht;
  }
 
  public static void main(String[] args) {
    ReturnRef rr = new ReturnRef();
    Hashtable<Integer, String> ht1 = rr.getValues(); // Prints sensitive data 123-45-6666
    ht1.remove(1); // Untrusted caller can remove entries
    Hashtable<Integer, String> ht2 = rr.getValues(); // Now prints null, original entry is removed
  }	
}

Compliant Solution (shallow copying)

Do not provide a getter method like getValues() that exposes private internal mutable object state without defensively copying the state. This applies largely to members containing mutable state, however, if the internal state is of sensitive nature even immutable data may not be returned to maintain the encapsulation property (the latter condition is not mandatory for compliance). Deep copies of mutable data are required to be returned whereas it suffices to return shallow copies of mutable fields containing immutable data.

This compliant solution creates and returns a shallow copy of the hash table containing immutable SSN numbers. As a result, any attempts to modify the original hash table are ineffective.

class ReturnRef {
// ...
  private Hashtable<Integer,String> getValues(){
    return (Hashtable<Integer, String>)ht.clone(); // shallow copy
  }

  public static void main(String[] args) {
    ReturnRef rr = new ReturnRef();
    Hashtable<Integer,String> ht1 = rr.getValues(); // prints non sensitive data
    ht1.remove(1); // untrusted caller can remove entries only from the copy
    Hashtable<Integer,String> ht2 = rr.getValues(); // prints non sensitive data     
  }
}

If the hash table contained references to mutable data such as a series of Date objects, every one of those objects must be copied by using a copy constructor or method. For further details, refer to FIO00-J. Defensively copy mutable inputs and mutable internal components and OBJ10-J. Provide mutable classes with copy functionality to allow passing instances to untrusted code safely. Note that the keys of a hash table need not be deep copied; shallow copying of the references suffices because a hash table's contract dictates that it cannot hold duplicate keys.

Noncompliant Code Example (mutable member)

This noncompliant code example shows a getDate() accessor method that returns the sole instance of the private Date object.

class MutableClass {
  private Date d;

  public MutableClass() {
    d = new Date();
  }

  public Date getDate() {
    return d;
  }
}

An untrusted caller will be able to manipulate this instance as it exposes internal mutable components beyond the trust boundaries of the class.

Compliant Solution (shallow copying using clone() for final classes)

Do not carry out defensive copying using the clone() method in constructors, when the (non-system) class can be subclassed by untrusted code. This will limit the malicious code from returning a crafted object when the object's clone() method is invoked.

Despite this advice, this compliant solution recommends returning a clone of the Date object. While this should not be done in constructors, it is permissible to use this technique in accessors. This is because there is no danger of a malicious subclass extending the internal mutable Date object (Date is a system class and consequently safe).

protected Date getDate() {
  return (Date)d.clone();
}

Arrays of primitive types are not exempt from this guideline. As arrays are objects in Java, if a reference to an array is returned, the caller may freely modify the contents of the original array. Shallow copies of arrays of primitive types are safe to return.

If the class has a public setter method it must follow related advice as given in FIO00-J. Defensively copy mutable inputs and mutable internal components. Note that a setter method may perform input validation and sanitization before setting the internal fields. On the other hand, returning references to internal objects may not require the caller to incorporate any of these defensive measures.

Noncompliant Code Example (mutable member array)

This noncompliant code example consists of an array of Date objects.

class MutableClass {
  private Date[] date;

  public MutableClass() {
    for(int i = 0; i < 20; i++)
      date[i] = new Date();
    }

  public Date[] getDate() {
    return date; // or return date.clone()
  }
}

It does not defensively copy the array before returning it. A shallow copy of the array may also be inappropriate in this case because Date is mutable.

Compliant Solution (deep copying)

This compliant solution creates a deep copy of the date array and returns the copy instead of the internal date array.

class MutableClass {
  private Date[] date;

  public MutableClass() {
    for(int i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
      date[i] = new Date();
    }
  }

  public Date[] getDate() {
    Date[] dates = new Date[20];
    for(int i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
      dates[i] = (Date) date[i].clone();
    }
    return dates;
  }
}

Exceptions

EX1: According to Sun's Secure Coding Guidelines document [[SCG 2007]]:

if a class merely serves as a container for mutable inputs or outputs (the class does not directly operate on them), it may not be necessary to create defensive copies. For example, arrays and the standard collection classes do not create copies of caller-provided values. If a copy is desired so updates to a value do not affect the corresponding value in the collection, the caller must create the copy before inserting it into the collection, or after receiving it from the collection.

EX2: If the performance of the copy method is within reasonable bounds and the class clearly documents its use, this guideline may be violated. (OBJ10-J. Provide mutable classes with copy functionality to allow passing instances to untrusted code safely)

EX3: If the caller exposes an unmodifiable view of the object, it may not be required to defensively program the class to return copies of internal members. This decision should be made early in the design of the API. Note that if some other code wants to use this class in the future, it must also expose unmodifiable views. (SEC14-J. Provide sensitive mutable classes with unmodifiable wrappers)

Risk Assessment

Returning references to internal object state (mutable or immutable) can render an application susceptible to information leaks and corruption of its objects' state and violate any class invariants. Control flow may also be affected in some cases.

Automated Detection

TODO

Related Vulnerabilities

Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.

Other Languages

This rule appears in the C++ Secure Coding Standard as OOP35-CPP. Do not return references to private data.

References

[[API 2006]] method clone()
[[Security 2006]]
[[Bloch 2008]] Item 39: Make defensive copies when needed
[[SCG 2007]] Guideline 2-1 Create a copy of mutable inputs and outputs
[[Haggar 2000]] Practical Java Praxis 64: Use clone for Immutable Objects When Passing or Receiving Object References to Mutable Objects
[[Goetz 2006]] 3.2. Publication and Escape: Allowing Internal Mutable State to Escape
[[Gong 2003]] 9.4 Private Object State and Object Immutability
[[MITRE 2009]] CWE ID 375 "Passing Mutable Objects to an Untrusted Method"

OBJ10-J. Provide mutable classes with copy functionality to allow passing instances to untrusted code safely      08. Object Orientation (OBJ)      OBJ12-J. Use checked collections against external code