According to the Java API [[API 2006]] class Object
, method hashcode()
documentation
Whenever it is invoked on the same object more than once during an execution of a Java application, the
hashCode
method must consistently return the same integer, provided no information used in equals comparisons on the object is modified. This integer need not remain consistent from one execution of an application to another execution of the same application.
Consequently, the hashcode of an object need not remain consistent across different executions of the application. Similarly, if an object is serialized, its hashcode may not stay consistent with the original value. This introduces several hurdles; for example, upon deserialization of a hashtable, it is impossible to retrieve the contained objects because the corresponding key values may have changed.
Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example uses the Key
class as the key index for the Hashtable
. According to the Java API [[API 2006]] class Hashtable
documentation
To successfully store and retrieve objects from a hashtable, the objects used as keys must implement the
hashCode
method and theequals
method.
This example follows the above advice but serialization is still at the mercy of the implementation of the hashcode()
method. It is not required to produce a key value (hashcode) that is consistent across different executions of the program or during (de)serialization. Consequently, using the default serialized form of the hashtable is inappropriate. In this noncompliant code example, it is not possible to retrieve the value of the object using the original key after deserialization.
class Key implements Serializable { // Overrides hashcode and equals methods } class HashSer { public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException { Hashtable<Key,String> ht = new Hashtable<Key, String>(); Key key = new Key(); ht.put(key, "Value"); System.out.println("Entry: " + ht.get(key)); // Retrieve using the key, works // Serialize the Hashtable object FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream("hashdata.ser"); ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(fos); oos.writeObject(ht); oos.close(); // Deserialize the Hashtable object FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream("hashdata.ser"); ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(fis); Hashtable<Key, String> ht_in = (Hashtable<Key, String>)(ois.readObject()); ois.close(); if(ht_in.contains("Value")) // Check if the object actually exists in the Hashtable System.out.println("Value was found in deserialized object."); if (ht_in.get(key) == null) // Gets printed System.out.println("Object was not found when retrieved using the key."); } }
Compliant Solution
This compliant solution changes the type of the key value so that it remains consistent across different runs of the program and a multitude of JVMs. This can be achieved by using an Integer
object, for example, to hold the key values.
class HashSer { public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException { Hashtable<Integer, String> ht = new Hashtable<Integer, String>(); ht.put(new Integer(1), "Value"); System.out.println("Entry: " + ht.get(1)); // Retrieve using the key // Serialize the Hashtable object FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream("hashdata.ser"); ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(fos); oos.writeObject(ht); oos.close(); // Deserialize the Hashtable object FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream("hashdata.ser"); ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(fis); Hashtable<Integer, String> ht_in = (Hashtable<Integer, String>)(ois.readObject()); ois.close(); if(ht_in.contains("Value")) // Check if the object actually exists in the Hashtable System.out.println("Value was found in deserialized object."); if (ht_in.get(1) == null) // Does not get printed System.out.println("Object was not found when retrieved using the key."); } }
This problem can also be avoided by overriding the equals()
and the hashcode()
method in the Key
class, though it is best to avoid serializing hash tables that are known to use implementation defined parameters.
Risk Assessment
Serializing objects with implementation defined characteristics can corrupt the state of the object.
Guideline |
Severity |
Likelihood |
Remediation Cost |
Priority |
Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
SER08-J |
low |
probable |
high |
P2 |
L3 |
Automated Detection
TODO
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this guideline on the CERT website.
Bibliography
[[API 2006]] Class Object
, Class Hashtable
[[Bloch 2008]] Item 75: "Consider using a custom serialized form"
SER07-J. Make defensive copies of private mutable components Serialization (SER) SER09-J. Do not deserialize from a privileged context