When performing pointer arithmetic, the size of the value to add to a pointer is automatically scaled to the size of the type of the pointed-to object. For instance, when adding a value to the byte address of a 4-byte integer, the value is scaled by a factor of 4 and then added to the pointer. Failing to understand how pointer arithmetic works can lead to miscalculations that result in serious errors, such as buffer overflows.
Noncompliant Code Example
In this noncompliant code example, integer values returned by parseint(getdata())
are stored into an array of INTBUFSIZE
elements of type int
called buf
[Dowd 2006]. If data is available for insertion into buf
(which is indicated by havedata()
) and buf_ptr
has not been incremented past buf + sizeof(buf)
, an integer value is stored at the address referenced by buf_ptr
. However, the sizeof
operator returns the total number of bytes in buf
, which is typically a multiple of the number of elements in buf
. This value is scaled to the size of an integer and added to buf
. As a result, the check to make sure integers are not written past the end of buf
is incorrect, and a buffer overflow is possible.
int buf[INTBUFSIZE]; int *buf_ptr = buf; while (havedata() && buf_ptr < (buf + sizeof(buf))) { *buf_ptr++ = parseint(getdata()); }
Compliant Solution
In this compliant solution, the size of buf
, INTBUFSIZE
, is added directly to buf
and used as an upper bound. The integer literal INTBUFSIZE
is scaled to the size of an integer, and the upper bound of buf
is checked correctly.
int buf[INTBUFSIZE]; int *buf_ptr = buf; while (havedata() && buf_ptr < (buf + INTBUFSIZE)) { *buf_ptr++ = parseint(getdata()); }
An arguably better solution is to use the address of the nonexistent element following the end of the array, as follows:
int buf[INTBUFSIZE]; int *buf_ptr = buf; while (havedata() && buf_ptr < &buf[INTBUFSIZE]) { *buf_ptr++ = parseint(getdata()); }
This solution works because the C Standard guarantees the address of buf[INTBUFSIZE]
even though no such element exists.
Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example is based on a flaw in the OpenBSD operating system. An integer, skip
, is added as an offset to a pointer of type struct big
. The adjusted pointer is then used as a destination address in a call to memset()
. However, when skip
is added to the struct big
pointer, it is automatically scaled by the size of struct big
, which is 32 bytes (assuming 4-byte integers, 8-byte long long
integers, and no structure padding). This scaling results in the call to memset()
writing to unintended memory.
struct big { unsigned long long ull_1; /* Typically 8 bytes */ unsigned long long ull_2; /* Typically 8 bytes */ unsigned long long ull_3; /* Typically 8 bytes */ int si_4; /* Typically 4 bytes */ int si_5; /* Typically 4 bytes */ }; /* ... */ int f(void) { size_t skip = offsetof(struct big, ull_2); struct big *s = (struct big *)malloc(sizeof(struct big)); if (!s) { return -1; /* Indicate malloc() failure */ } memset(s + skip, 0, sizeof(struct big) - skip); /* ... */ free(s); s = NULL; return 0; }
A similar situation occurred in OpenBSD's make
command [Murenin 2007].
Compliant Solution
To correct this example, the struct big
pointer is cast as a char *
, which causes skip
to be scaled by a factor of 1:
struct big { unsigned long long ull_1; /* Typically 8 bytes */ unsigned long long ull_2; /* Typically 8 bytes */ unsigned long long ull_3; /* Typically 8 bytes */ int si_4; /* Typically 4 bytes */ int si_5; /* Typically 4 bytes */ }; /* ... */ int f(void) { size_t skip = offsetof(struct big, ull_2); struct big *s = (struct big *)malloc(sizeof(struct big)); if (!s) { return -1; /* Indicate malloc() failure */ } memset((char *)s + skip, 0, sizeof(struct big) - skip); /* ... */ free(s); s = NULL; return 0; }
Risk Assessment
Failure to understand and properly use pointer arithmetic can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code.
Recommendation | Severity | Likelihood | Remediation Cost | Priority | Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
EXP08-C | High | Probable | High | P6 | L2 |
Automated Detection
Tool | Version | Checker | Description |
---|---|---|---|
Astrée | 24.04 | Supported: Astrée reports potential runtime errors resulting from invalid pointer arithmetics. | |
CodeSonar | 8.1p0 | LANG.STRUCT.PARITH | Pointer arithmetic |
Helix QAC | 2024.3 | C0488, C2930, C2931, C2932, C2933 | |
Klocwork | 2024.3 | ABV.ITERATOR ABV.GENERAL ABV.GENERAL.MULTIDIMENSION | |
LDRA tool suite | 9.7.1 | 45 D | Partially implemented |
Parasoft C/C++test | 2023.1 | CERT_C-EXP08-a | Pointer arithmetic should not be used |
Parasoft Insure++ | Runtime analysis | ||
PC-lint Plus | 1.4 | 416 | Partially supported |
Polyspace Bug Finder | R2024a | Checks for:
Rec. fully supported. | |
PVS-Studio | 7.33 | V503, V520, V574, V600, V613, V619, V620, V643, V650, V687, V769, V1004 |
How long is 4 yards plus 3 feet? It is obvious from elementary arithmetic that any answer involving 7 is wrong, as the student did not take the units into account. The right method is to convert both numbers to reflect the same units.
The examples in this rule reflect both a correct and an incorrect way to handle comparisons of numbers representing different things (either single bytes or multibyte data structures). The noncompliant examples just add the numbers without regard to units, whereas the compliant solutions use type casts to convert one number to the appropriate unit of the other number.
ROSE can catch both noncompliant examples by searching for pointer arithmetic expressions involving different units. The "different units" is the tricky part, but you can try to identify an expression's units using some simple heuristics:
- A pointer to a
foo
object hasfoo
as the unit. - A pointer to
char *
has byte as the unit. - Any
sizeof
oroffsetof
expression also has unit byte as the unit. - Any variable used in an index to an array of
foo
objects (e.g.,foo[variable]
) hasfoo
as the unit.
In addition to pointer arithmetic expressions, you can also hunt for array index expressions, as array[index]
is merely shorthand for "array + index
."
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
Related Guidelines
SEI CERT C++ Coding Standard | VOID EXP08-CPP. Ensure pointer arithmetic is used correctly |
ISO/IEC TR 24772:2013 | Pointer Casting and Pointer Type Changes [HFC] Pointer Arithmetic [RVG] |
ISO/IEC TS 17961 | Forming or using out-of-bounds pointers or array subscripts [invptr] |
MISRA C:2012 | Rule 18.1 (required) Rule 18.2 (required) Rule 18.3 (required) Rule 18.4 (advisory) |
MITRE CWE | CWE-468, Incorrect pointer scaling |
Bibliography
[Dowd 2006] | Chapter 6, "C Language Issues" |
[Murenin 2007] |
9 Comments
Stephen Friedl
Shouldn't the second example be using offsetof() instead of trying to count offsets directly?
Or wouldn't the code be a lot easier to understand if it had been rewritten as:
*Poof* - no funky pointer stuff.
David Keaton
I implemented the
offsetof()
solution because it looks cleaner to me and does not add run-time overhead.Stephen Friedl
The offsetof() solution is the right one, though at times I do make minor concessions to runtime performance if I think it will make the code easier to understand by the next guy who has to work on my code. Clarity breeds maintainability.
Josh Triplett
The first compliant example could alternatively use
sizeof(buf)/sizeof(buf[0])
, which represents the standard idiom for checking the size of an array.partner55040717
The first example is better coded:
since "the Standard endorses existing practice by guaranteeing that it's permissible to use the address of
buf[INTBUFSIZE] even though no such element exists." (from The C Book, by Mike Banahan). This is clearer and less
error-prone than the alternatives
Robert Seacord
OK, it took me a while, but I'll buy this. Added as a "arguably better" compliant solution.
Alex Bock
The while condition for this example is missing the closing right parenthesis.
David Svoboda
Fixed, thanx
Martin Sebor
As i just commented elsewhere, this problem this practice attempts to prevent is the subject of ARR30-C. Do not form or use out of bounds pointers or array subscripts. I suggest this recommendation be moved into 99. The Void (perhaps after copying the first NCCE into ARR30-C, if we'd like to preserve it).