Proper input sanitization can prevent insertion of malicious data into a subsystem such as a database. However, different subsystems require different types of sanitization. Fortunately, it is usually obvious which subsystems will eventually receive which inputs, and consequently what type of sanitization is required.
Several subsystems exist for the purpose of outputting data. An HTML renderer is one common subsystem for displaying output. Data sent to an output subsystem may appear to originate from a trusted source. However, it is dangerous to assume that output sanitization is unnecessary because such data may indirectly originate from an untrusted source and may include malicious content. Failure to properly sanitize data passed to an output subsystem can allow several types of attacks. For example, HTML renderers are prone to HTML injection and cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks [OWASP 2011]. Output sanitization to prevent such attacks is as vital as input sanitization.
As with input validation, data should be normalized before sanitizing it for malicious characters. Properly encode all output characters other than those known to be safe to avoid vulnerabilities caused by data that bypasses validation. See IDS01-J. Normalize strings before validating them for more information.
Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example uses the model-view-controller (MVC) concept of the Java EE–based Spring Framework to display data to the user without encoding or escaping it. Because the data is sent to a web browser, the code is subject to both HTML injection and XSS attacks.
@RequestMapping("/getnotifications.htm") public ModelAndView getNotifications( HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) { ModelAndView mv = new ModelAndView(); try { UserInfo userDetails = getUserInfo(); List<Map<String,Object>> list = new ArrayList<Map<String, Object>>(); List<Notification> notificationList = NotificationService.getNotificationsForUserId(userDetails.getPersonId()); for (Notification notification: notificationList) { Map<String,Object> map = new HashMap<String, Object>(); map.put("id", notification.getId()); map.put("message", notification.getMessage()); list.add(map); } mv.addObject("Notifications", list); } catch(Throwable t) { // Log to file and handle } return mv; }
Compliant Solution
This compliant solution defines a ValidateOutput
class that normalizes the output to a known character set, performs output sanitization using a whitelist, and encodes any unspecified data values to enforce a double-checking mechanism. Note that the required whitelisting patterns can vary according to the specific needs of different fields [OWASP 2013].
public class ValidateOutput { // Allows only alphanumeric characters and spaces private static final Pattern pattern = Pattern.compile("^[a-zA-Z0-9\\s]{0,20}$"); // Validates and encodes the input field based on a whitelist public String validate(String name, String input) throws ValidationException { String canonical = normalize(input); if (!pattern.matcher(canonical).matches()) { throw new ValidationException("Improper format in " + name + " field"); } // Performs output encoding for nonvalid characters canonical = HTMLEntityEncode(canonical); return canonical; } // Normalizes to known instances private String normalize(String input) { String canonical = java.text.Normalizer.normalize(input, Normalizer.Form.NFKC); return canonical; } // Encodes nonvalid data private static String HTMLEntityEncode(String input) { StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer(); for (int i = 0; i < input.length(); i++) { char ch = input.charAt(i); if (Character.isLetterOrDigit(ch) || Character.isWhitespace(ch)) { sb.append(ch); } else { sb.append("&#" + (int)ch + ";"); } } return sb.toString(); } } // ... @RequestMapping("/getnotifications.htm") public ModelAndView getNotifications(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) { ValidateOutput vo = new ValidateOutput(); ModelAndView mv = new ModelAndView(); try { UserInfo userDetails = getUserInfo(); List<Map<String,Object>> list = new ArrayList<Map<String,Object>>(); List<Notification> notificationList = NotificationService.getNotificationsForUserId(userDetails.getPersonId()); for (Notification notification: notificationList) { Map<String,Object> map = new HashMap<String,Object>(); map.put("id", vo.validate("id", notification.getId())); map.put("message", vo.validate("message", notification.getMessage())); list.add(map); } mv.addObject("Notifications", list); } catch(Throwable t) { // Log to file and handle } return mv; }
Output encoding and escaping is mandatory when accepting dangerous characters such as double quotes and angle braces. Even when input is whitelisted to disallow such characters, output escaping is recommended because it provides a second level of defense. Note that the exact escape sequence can vary depending on where the output is embedded. For example, untrusted output may occur in an HTML value attribute, CSS, URL, or script; output encoding routine will be different in each case. It is also impossible to securely use untrusted data in some contexts. Consult the OWASP XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet for more information on preventing XSS attacks.
Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example takes a user input query string and build a URL. Because the URL is not properly encoded, the URL returned may not be valid if it contains non-URL-safe characters, as per RFC 1738.
String buildUrl(String q) { String url = "https://example.com?query=" + q; return url; }
For example, if the user supplies the input string "<#catgifs>", the url
returned is "https://example.com?query=<#catgifs>"
which is not a valid URL.
Compliant Solution (Java 8)
Use java.util.Base64
to encode and decode data when transferring binary data over mediums that only allow printable characters like URLs, filenames, and MIME.
String buildEncodedUrl(String q) { String encodedUrl = "https://example.com?query=" + Base64.getUrlEncoder().encodeToString(q.getBytes()); return encodedUrl; }
If the user supplies the input string "<#catgifs>", the url
returned is "
https://example.com?query=%3C%23catgifs%3E"
which is a valid URL.
Applicability
Failure to encode or escape output before it is displayed or passed across a trust boundary can result in the execution of arbitrary code.
Automated Detection
Tool | Version | Checker | Description |
---|---|---|---|
The Checker Framework | 2.1.3 | Tainting Checker | Trust and security errors (see Chapter 8) |
Parasoft Jtest | 2024.1 | CERT.IDS51.TDRESP CERT.IDS51.TDXSS | Protect against HTTP response splitting Protect against XSS vulnerabilities |
Related Vulnerabilities
The Apache GERONIMO-1474 vulnerability, reported in January 2006, allowed attackers to submit URLs containing JavaScript. The Web Access Log Viewer failed to sanitize the data it forwarded to the administrator console, thereby enabling a classic XSS attack.
Bibliography
[OWASP 2011] | Cross-site Scripting (XSS) |
[OWASP 2014] | How to Add Validation Logic to HttpServletRequest XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet |
10 Comments
Dhruv Mohindra
David Svoboda
The NCCE needs some details...displaying output is not always bad. For instance the code:
is suitable contents for the
display()
function, but has no sanitization problems.Also, we traditionally describe the exploit-ability of code in text after the code, not in a comment.
Fred Long
For your first point, the rules IDS00-J. Sanitize untrusted data passed across a trust boundary and IDS01-J. Normalize strings before validating them are talking about sanitizing input. This guideline emphasizes that it can also be important to sanitize output.
(The other things can be fixed.)
Dhruv Mohindra
CS needs to be compared with the encodeXSS() method mentioned in http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E16764_01/apirefs.1111/e13941/weblogic/servlet/security/Utils.html.
Fred Long
Revised to try to address all the points raised by the comments above.
Robert Seacord (Manager)
In the intro section, we talk about output sanitization and not output filtering. i'm guessing these two concepts are the same and we should use the term "sanitization" for consistency.
Robert Seacord (Manager)
If we are going to include "GERONIMO-1474" as a related vulnerability, this is certainly insufficient for a print book. We'll need to include some description of why this particular vulnerability is a violation of this guideline.
Robert Seacord (Manager)
I get lost sometimes in the exact definition of Cross Site Scripting (XSS), but if I'm putting JavaScript in a database as an insider and then viewing the results, I don't think there is anything cross site about that.
Fred Long
I've attempted to address the three comments above.
Dhruv Mohindra