If a user encounters signed code, chances are that the code requires more than appropriate privileges to carry out its operations. It is in the interest of the users to verify the authenticity and integrity of the artifacts that they wish to deploy. Although it is usually a bad idea to sign code, some actions necessitate this step. For example, if the application needs to establish an http connection with an external host to download plugins or extensions, a vendor may provide signed code instead of having the user deal with complex security policies. Because executing signed code can be extremely dangerous, verifying authenticity of origin is of utmost importance. Users are most often not the best judges of what code is safe to execute and what constitutes malicious code.
Java based technologies typically use the Java Archive (JAR) feature for packaging files to facilitate platform independent deployment. Be it desktop applications, Enterprise Java Beans (EJB), MIDlets (J2ME) or Weblogic Server J2EE applications, for example, JAR files are the preferred distribution mechanism. The point and click installation provided by Java Web Start also relies on the JAR file format for packaging. Vendors sign their JAR files when required, however, this should not be interpreted to be the case that the code cannot be misused.
According to the Java Tutorials [[Tutorials 08]]:
If you are creating applet code that you will sign, it needs to be placed in a JAR file. The same is true if you are creating application code that may be similarly restricted by running it with a security manager. The reason you need the JAR file is that when a policy file specifies that code signed by a particular entity is permitted one or more operations, such as specific file reads or writes, the code is expected to come from a signed JAR file. (The term "signed code" is an abbreviated way of saying "code in a class file that appears in a JAR file that was signed.")
Depending on how the client code works, signatures may or may not be automatically checked programatically. For example, any instances of URLClassLoader and its subclasses and java.util.jar automatically verify a signature whenever the JAR file is signed. If however, the developer implements a custom classloader that goes on to subclass java.lang.ClassLoader, this step is not performed automatically. Moreover, in the URLClassLoader case, the automatic verification just involves an integrity check and does not authenticate the loaded class. This is because the check uses a public key that is contained within the JAR. The legit JAR file may be replaced with a malicious JAR file containing a different public key and hash values.
Noncompliant Code Example
This noncompliant code example demonstrates the JarRunner application that can be used to dynamically execute a particular class residing within a JAR file [Tutorials 08]. It creates a JarClassLoader that loads an application update, plugin or patch over an untrusted network such as the Internet. The URL to fetch the code is specified as the first argument (for example, http://somewebsite.com/software-updates.jar
) and any other arguments specify the arguments that are to be passed to the class to be loaded. Reflection is used to invoke the main method of the loaded class.
Unfortunately, there are no built in checks for verifying the signature. Any man in the middle can construct a class that will run with the permissions specified for this code source in the policy file.
public class JarRunner {
public static void main(String[] args) {
if (args.length < 1) { usage(); }
URL url = null;
try {
url = new URL(args[0]);
} catch (MalformedURLException e) { fatal("Invalid URL: " + args[0]); }
// Create the class loader for the application jar file
JarClassLoader cl = new JarClassLoader(url);
// Get the application's main class name
String name = null;
try {
name = cl.getMainClassName();
} catch (IOException e) { System.err.println("I/O error while loading JAR file:");
System.exit(1); }
if (name == null)
{ fatal("Specified jar file does not contain a 'Main-Class'" + " manifest attribute"); }
// Get arguments for the application
String[] newArgs = new String[args.length - 1];
System.arraycopy(args, 1, newArgs, 0, newArgs.length);
// Invoke application's main class
try {
cl.invokeClass(name, newArgs);
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) { fatal("Class not found: " + name); }
catch (NoSuchMethodException e) { fatal("Class does not define a 'main' method: " + name); }
catch (InvocationTargetException e) { e.getTargetException().printStackTrace(); System.exit(1); }
}
private static void fatal(String s) {
System.err.println(s);
System.exit(1);
}
private static void usage() {
fatal("Usage: java JarRunner url [args..]");
}
}
class JarClassLoader extends URLClassLoader {
private URL url;
public JarClassLoader(URL url) {
super(new URL[] { url });
this.url = url;
}
public String getMainClassName() throws IOException {
URL u = new URL("jar", "", url + "!/");
JarURLConnection uc = (JarURLConnection) u.openConnection();
Attributes attr = uc.getMainAttributes();
return attr != null ? attr.getValue(Attributes.Name.MAIN_CLASS) : null;
}
public void invokeClass(String name, String[] args)
throws ClassNotFoundException, NoSuchMethodException,
InvocationTargetException {
Class c = loadClass(name);
Method m = c.getMethod("main", new Class[] { args.getClass() });
m.setAccessible(true);
int mods = m.getModifiers();
if (m.getReturnType() != void.class || !Modifier.isStatic(mods)
|| !Modifier.isPublic(mods)) { throw new NoSuchMethodException("main"); }
try {
m.invoke(null, new Object[] { args });
} catch (IllegalAccessException e) { System.out.println("Access denied"); }
}
}
Compliant Solution
If the program expects the user to manually install the new JAR file, the user can explicitly check the signature from the command line. Any malicious tampering results in a SecurityException when the jarsigner tool is invoked with the -verify option.
jarsigner -verify signed-updates-jar-file.jar
An explicit signature verification check should be built within the invoking program. This can be achieved by obtaining the chain of certificates from the CodeSource of the class being loaded and checking if any one of the certificates belongs to the trusted signer whose certificate has been obtained securely beforehand and stored in a local keystore. The invokeClass method can be modified to do this as shown in this compliant solution.
Class c = loadClass(name);
Certificate[] certs = c.getProtectionDomain().getCodeSource().getCertificates();
if(certs == null) {
System.out.println("No signature!"); return; // return, do not execute if unsigned
}
KeyStore ks = KeyStore.getInstance("JKS");
ks.load(new FileInputStream(System.getProperty("user.home"+ File.separator + "keystore.jks")),
"loadkeystorepassword".toCharArray());
Certificate pubCert = ks.getCertificate("user"); // user is the alias
certs[0].verify(pubCert.getPublicKey()); // check with the trusted public key, else throws exception
It is not always the case that arbitrary code gets executed. By default, the URLClassLoader and all its subclasses are only given enough permissions to interact with the URL that was specified when the URLClassLoader object was created. This means that the program can interact with the specified host by default. However, this does not mitigate the risk completely as the loaded file may need to be granted appropriate privileges to perform more sensitive operations such as updating an existing local JAR file.
Risk Assessment
Not verifying the digital signature either manually or programmatically may lead to execution of malicious code.
Rule |
Severity |
Likelihood |
Remediation Cost |
Priority |
Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SEC05-J |
high |
probable |
medium |
P12 |
L1 |
Automated Detection
TODO
Related Vulnerabilities
Search for vulnerabilities resulting from the violation of this rule on the CERT website.
References
[[API 06]]
[[Gong 03]] 12.8.3 jarsigner
[[Eclipse 08]] JAR Signing and Signed bundles and protecting against malicious code
[[Halloway 01]]
[[Flanagan 05]] Chapter 24. The java.util.jar Package
[[Oaks 01]] Chapter 12: Digital Signatures, Signed Classes
[[Tutorials 08]] The JarRunner Class, Lesson: API and Tools Use for Secure Code and File Exchanges and Verifying Signed JAR Files
[[JarSpec 08]] Signature Validation
[[Bea 08]]
[[Muchow 01]]
[[MITRE 09]] CWE ID 300 "Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint (aka 'Man-in-the-Middle')", CWE ID 319 "Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information", CWE ID 494 "Download of Code Without Integrity Check", CWE ID 347 "Improperly Verified Signature"
SEC03-J. Do not allow tainted parameters while using APIs that perform access checks against the immediate caller 01. Platform Security (SEC) SEC06-J. Assume that all Java clients can be reverse engineered, monitored, and modified